Nutzungsbedingungen
No. 2081/1992) 1 . This decision implies that regional-origin labelling has to be associated with a quality-control system that leads to a superior quality, if the program is to be subsidised by the government.
Generic promotion of agricultural products by EU member countries as well as regional marketing initiatives by federal states in line with these regulations have been widespread for years. However, despite the high -and possibly increasingvalue the EU addresses to the promotion of regional products, analytical work on the economic impacts of those initiatives is lacking. While the economic importance of regional-origin labelled products in consumer demand has been confirmed [BALLING 1 There are two kinds of regional origin that are registered and protected under Council Regulation No. 2081/1992: (i) Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and (ii) Protected Geographical Indication (PGI) . Under the first definition -being more advanced -foodstuffs have to be produced, processed and prepared in the designated region. A causal link has to be proven to exist between the regional origin and the quality, which has to be "essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical environment with its inherent natural and human factors" (Art. 2, Council Regulation No. 2081 /1992 . The PGI covers a product where at least one of the stages -production, processing, or preparationoccurs in the designated area. In a somewhat weaker formulation than for PDOs, quality, reputation or other characteristics are "attributable to that geographical origin" (ibid., Art. 2) for a PGI. of regional-origin labelling results in a significant price mark-up for farmers remains largely unanswered. As the second pillar of the EU's CAP aims at strengthening the development of rural areas and providing farmers with diversified opportunities for the marketing of quality products, supporting regional promotion measures of produce from remote locations that feature quality-control systems could be of added significance. Given this background, it is the objective of this paper to provide a methodological framework for the analysis of regional marketing programs which include regional-origin labelling as well as quality assurance and control. An equilibrium-displacement model (EDM) for a segmented market with differential qualities is developed that extends most of the existing approaches in the generic advertising and country-of-origin literature. We investigate the extent to which a phased reduction of initial governmental support levels impacts farmer price premiums and welfare. It could be argued that with increasing producer cost shares for program participation farmers lack the incentive to participate in regional marketing activities that meet a growing consumer demand for high-quality foods from designated regional origins. Results suggest that full governmental support to regional-marketing programs provide significant price mark-ups at the farm level.
Our framework can be applied to a variety of regional marketing programs. An empirical application of the model is illustrated for a selected European case, i.e.
"Certified Quality -Bavaria".
Review of Literature
There is a well-established literature on the economics of generic promotion, starting 
The Model
The EDM methodology was originally proposed by MUTH (1964) and reviewed by PIGGOTT (1992) and ALSTON, NORTON and PARDEY (1995) . The objective of the EDM approach applied in this study is to model the producer price and welfare effects and their implications for state-financed regional-origin programs of qualitydifferentiated products and regionally segmented markets.
In our general model each region can produce for a uniform standard-quality market which we call the "mass" market. Each region can also incur additional program participation costs and produce for a high-quality market which is regionally labelled. The demand for these high quality regional products may be augmented by regional promotion expenditures borne within and outside the region.
As stated earlier, a linkage between improved product quality and regional-origin labelling is a justification for government-subsidised promotion efforts. So, we seek a model that will enable us to evaluate promotional programs designed to send quality signals based on regional origin. However, as shown by KINNUCAN (1996) , when markets are interrelated, ignoring the cross-price and cross-advertising effects will yield biased measures of advertising effectiveness. Hence, the model explicitly accounts for various cross-price and cross-advertising elasticities. Given the nature of regional-origin labelling, the assumption of perfect product substitutability between "mass" and labeled products from different regions is resolved in favor of a more realistic assumption of differentiated products based on their regional origin and quality. We extend the existing work and present a general model which allows for interactions between "mass" and regional-origin markets with respect to price, regional advertising, supply response and differing cost structures.
Structure of the Model
A multi-equation market-equilibrium model for two regions engaged in regionalorigin labelling which are related in price, advertising and costs is specified as Supply:
Market Equilibrium:
where i = region A or B; j = mass-market product M, high-quality product A or B;
P is a vector of producer prices, A is a vector of regional advertising expenditures, C = additional producer cost of participation in the regional advertising program, and Z and X are exogenous supply and demand shifters. We assume competitive markets at the farm level. Prices and quantities are determined endogenously according to the market equilibrium (3).
We follow the general methods used by KINNUCAN and MYRLAND (2003) and PIGGOTT (2003) , where dx/x=d lnx is the percentage change of any variable x. Then use of the logarithmic differential approximation to equations (1) - (3) yields the following multi-equation EDM where the parameters are interpreted as elasticities.
Region A
Supply: 
Superscripts denote the region (A or B), subscripts denote products (mass-quality product M, high-quality product A, or high-quality labelled product B), 's are ownand cross-price elasticities of supply; 's are own-and cross-price elasticities of demand, e's are the own-and cross-advertising elasticities, and C's represent the h ) is the market share of the total demand for high-quality product A within region A (B).
As we start from the idea of regional-origin labelling with quality control, this implies vertical product differentiation. Thus, the demand functions of model (4) to (16) do not include a substitutive relationship between the two quality levels.
Substitution effects occur at one given quality level only, i.e. between qualities A and B but not between either A or B as opposed to M (KINNUCAN/XIAO/HSIA 1996).
There also is substitution on the supply side between the two different qualities. A rising price in the high-quality market leads to a reduction of supply on the low-
Given exogenous market shares, advertising quantities, and program-participation cost, the linear equation system (14) - (16) 
where the a matrix includes own-and cross-price elasticities of supply and demand as well as market shares, the b matrix captures own-and cross-advertising elasticities, and the c matrix includes parameters associated with the added cost of regional program participation. 2 We assume the components of X and Z are subsumed in the constant terms of equations (1) and (2).
3 If for supply,
, where SA h and SB h are supply shares on the mass market originating from region A and B, respectively. This same relationship holds for markets segmented on the demand side. The solution to equation (17) can be used to evaluate the total and distribution of changes in producer welfare due to regional advertising. This can be accomplished by computing changes in producer surplus (PS) in each market, assuming parallel shifts in demand and supply.
(20)
Possible Model Uses
The model presented above has been designed for a combined analysis of regionalorigin labelling and quality control. Accordingly, the implications of promotion expenditures for the labelled products can be elaborated as well as the consequences of increasing producer costs due to the instruments of quality control. The model allows for the general situation where competing high-quality products exist as well as a common non-competing lower-quality mass product. This is typical for the current situation in the EU where different regional labels have been introduced, e.g., for beef, advertising occurs for competing labels. A crucial task in the empirical application of the model is to define precisely (i) the competing high-quality products and (ii) the relevant market on which the products compete.
If strong competition between high-quality segments of the market does not exist, it would be necessary to restrict the model to distinguish only one regional label from Our model differs from these approaches in the literature in two major respects:
1. The modelling framework is applied to regional-origin labelling. None of the other modelling approaches has been used to study this issue. We now provide an application of the model to a regional-labelling and qualitycontrol scheme. The case study is related to the German program "Certified QualityBavaria".
An Empirical Application

Background
The origin of Bavarian regional-origin labelling dates back to 1985 when the program "Quality from Bavaria" was established by the Bavarian Ministry for and retailers who agreed to a detailed system of quality control. This requirement is 
The Bavarian Beef Market
The general model is specified to characterise the "Certified Quality -Bavaria" program. The model structure consists of two regions (Bavaria and Rest of Germany -ROG), a single high-quality product (produced in Bavaria but sold in both regions) and a common mass-market product (produced in both regions).
Bavaria (Region A)
Supply:
Rest of Germany (Region B)
Demand: 
Again, superscripts characterise regions A and B, and subscripts the high-quality product A and the mass product M. Bavaria is the largest exporter of beef among all German federal states. Bavarian exports occur both under the regional label and for unlabelled beef, i.e. for the high-quality and the mass market. Therefore, there is demand for Bavarian beef in the rest of Germany for both qualities (equations (26) and (27)). As exports from the region go to various regional markets in Germany, Bavarian beef competes with beef under various other labels as well as foreign beef.
There is no single competitor of regionally-labelled Bavarian beef in the high-quality market sector. Thus, we posit that the labelled product is of superior quality to that of the mass market. We distinguish only the regional label as the high-quality beef product from the mass (lower-quality) beef product.
In the Bavarian case, the high-quality price (P A ) is what wholesalers pay producers; it does not include deductions for advertising. The producer contribution to advertising is a cost which must be deducted from P A to obtain a net producer price P P . We derive P p from equation (5) Here is the relative horizontal shift in the high-quality supply curve due to the added cost of producing high-quality beef. Substituting (30) into (5) yields
where A A K = is the relative vertical shift in the price direction. Further, the change in producer price (P P ) is defined when K = 0 as
and the level of the producer price is given as
(33)
The logic of our comparative-static analysis can be followed by referring to Figure 1 .
With no advertising (and presumably no higher-quality product) we begin with the 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60   F  o  r  P  e  e  r  R  e  v  i  e  w 16 between high quality and "mass" quality beef is 0.1. Some recent econometric studies based on demand systems indicate that our price and cross-price elasticities might be at the lower end, suggesting that the price elasticity of demand for beef has increased over time and might now be above unity (WILDNER 2000) .
Market simulation results can be particularly sensitive to both the advertising elasticities as well as the marginal cost of participation parameter. Given an advertising elasticity of 0.04 in both markets, we focus attention over the sensitivity of the market impacts of the cost parameter ( ). The price and quantity change effects are extended to producer welfare effects in each market segment. 
Simulations
Our benchmark simulations are based on actual segmented-market data for the year 2003. At that time, the mass-quality price (P M ) averaged € 2.31. While high-quality certified Bavarian product price premium over the mass-market product varied considerably, the premium achieved could be as much as ten percent. In Bavaria, the annual production of labelled and mass market beef was 107,608 and 161,413 million kgs., respectively. We assume that there exists no competing regional-quality label in any state of ROG. In the ROG, no high-quality labelled beef was produced.
However, the production of mass-market beef was 1,160,523 kgs. Thus, the market shares of mass-market beef produced in Bavaria and ROG were 12 and 88 percent, respectively. Our benchmark assumes the existence of an ongoing promotion program in Bavaria which implies that the producer cost of participation are included in the existing supply function for the labelled product. Thus, shifts in the supply function are due to producer contributions associated with promotional labelling. In 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59  60 F o r P e e r R e v i e w 17 our simulations from the baseline, we explore the effects of a 100 percent increase in the promotional expenditures for Bavarian quality-labelled beef.
In Table 2 we show how increased regional quality advertising affects prices and quantities in the segmented markets and how these change as producers share the cost of advertising with the government. Suppose the situation is that the regional labelling of "Certified Quality -Bavaria" is subsidised by 100 percent governmental payments ( = 0). This is especially likely for the year 2003 where the regional quality label was revised by the EU commission and launched on the market 4 . Since that time, governmental support was scheduled to be reduced by 10% per year.
Table 2: Price and Quantity Effects of Increased Advertising of High-Quality Bavarian Beef
The simulated advertising-induced outward demand shift increases both the wholesale price of Bavarian beef (P A ) and the producer price (P P ). Notwithstanding increased wholesale prices for the Bavarian high-quality product, as producers are asked to share in the cost of advertising ( increases), net producer price falls as the cost-induced supply function shifts leftward. Producer contributions act as a wedge between wholesale and producer prices. This wedge can increase until the added advertising cost exactly equals the benefits. This breakeven point is where the benefit-cost parameter | | = 1.0 and the increase in P A is 8.0 percent. Different changes in P A and P P are observed as the breakeven point ( ) moves "up or down" in Table 2 .
Changes in producer surplus (PS) associated with the promotion of "Certified Quality -Bavaria" are shown in Table 3 . Clearly, the overall change in producer surplus is greatest when the demand shift is entirely government subsidised ( = 0). However, for the profit-maximising producer, it makes sense to share in the cost of advertising because positive changes in PS continue as producers contribute up to a breakeven point, again where = 1.0; that is, where the change in producer surplus is zero. Also, producers are expected to contribute as scheduled government subsidies decrease. The breakeven point increases when the advertising contribution of the Bavarian producers rises. in PS is greatest in the "no cost" situation, where 0 = . The last column in Table 3 shows the sum of the high-quality and mass-market effects for Bavaria. On a perfarm basis clear gains to advertising are seen even as producers share in the cost of advertising. Note that these are changes in producer surplus, so it is profitable for producers to contribute to the advertising effort up to the point where . 0 = PS
Concluding Remarks
Quality signals of regionally produced products can be economically beneficial to producers. The benefits accrued are directly related to the effectiveness to which the demand for the high-quality product can be augmented with advertising, the cost associated with the advertising effort and, of course, the basic economic structural characteristics of the market segments under study.
Policy conclusions arise from the analysis. Quality control for regional products and regional-origin labelling are supposed to raise the income of farmers in rural areas and, thus, contribute to rural development. A pre-condition is that the income effect of rising demand outweighs that of increasing costs due to participation in the new programme. These results are based on computed benefit-cost ratios of regionalorigin labelling from the producers' point of view. Additional analyses are needed as to whether policies are successful under an extended regional objective function that includes changes in consumer surplus and additional regional expenditures for the labelling scheme. More research is necessary, too, regarding the aggregate assessment of regional-origin labelling from the federal or national point of view. In this paper we suggest a general economic framework that can be used to examine problems of this nature. We illustrate this framework with an empirical examination of the "Certified Quality -Bavaria" promotion program. This illustration includes two regions, Bavaria and Rest of Germany (ROG), both of which produce beef for the mass-market but only Bavaria produces the higher quality-labelled product of pure guaranteed Bavarian origin. We allow for trade in both products between regions.
The promotion of the Bavarian labelled product in Bavaria positively influences both regions and products. All market segments can gain. While clearly producer gains are great when the cost of the advertising the Bavarian labelled product is financed entirely by the government, it remains rational for profit-maximising producers to cofinance contributions as well.
We found our proposed analytical framework to be a flexible and easy-to-use tool to simulate market behaviour in response to promoting the Bavarian quality-labelled product. We believe it is generally applicable to examine a number of policy-related issues in segmented commodity markets.
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